Wednesday, May 6, 2009

MONGOLIA’S ADVANTAGES OF MEDIATION

Mongolia has unique fundamental advantages for mediation comparing to other nations in the Central and Northeast Asia, partially because of its "smallness."

No Territorial Disputes, No Attached Interests

Mongolia has clear border demarcation with both Russia and China. Both neighbors recognized absence of territorial disputes with Ulaanbaatar (Грайворонский 1999, 67). This fact makes it only country that has no territorial disputes in the region.

A country that has territorial disputes with one of two disputing parties can never be a neutral mediator for the issue the parties deal with. No Central Asian country has clear demarcation with all its neighbors today. Nor NEA nations have settled their territorial disputes. Lack of border demarcation and unsettled territorial claims effectively remove these countries from list of possible neutral mediators.

Friendly Relationship with All Regional Actors

Mongolia has friendly relations with all countries in the region. There is no "hostile" nation in both Central and Northeast Asia, therefore, all nations deserve to name their relationships "friendly" and they do; however, Ulaanbaatar's "friendliness" comes from its "smallness."

In Mongolia's case, the word "friendly" may refer twofold meanings. First, it means no disputed issues with other regional actors. Denying any possible reason of disputes is a survival strategy of a small country. Ulaanbaatar certainly has different views and positions form other regional powers, including neighbors, on certain issues like that was in Iraqi War, but the strategy requires avoiding and settling the difference of views before it escalates to disputes. "Friendly" policy makes Ulaanbaatar the best choice for mediator of the regional security issues since it prevents Ulaanbaatar from backing up one regional power against another,

Second, it means tolerance with and recognition of differences of views. This explains Mongolia's good relationship with the DPRK. Exchange of high level officials' visits has gradually increased between the two nations. Prime Minister of Mongolia has twice visited in Pyongyang recently, and Kim Yong Nam, President of Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly paid an official visit in Ulaanbaatar in 2007. Two nations have signed Treaty of Friendly Relationship and Cooperation in 2002 (Mongolia - DPRK Agreements n.d.). Mongolia hosts guest workers from North Korea in its agricultural and construction sectors. Although Mongolia is not a rich country, it generously provides humanitarian assistance to North Korea (Mongolia - DPRK Agreements n.d.) and offers its hospitality to those North Korean citizen who decided to leave their country. Friendly relationship with North Korea provides a potential advantage of Mongolia's mediating role although the success will depend on Pyongyang's recognition of Ulaanbaatar's policy and Beijing's interest to become a bridge between North Korea and the world.

Small Power as Honest and Impartial Broker

Mongolia's inability of exerting power to change others' policies strengthens the credibility of its potential mediation in the region. Nations discussing a sensitive security issue in Ulaanbaatar may feel comfortable about the host country's neutral intention.

Smallness of Mongolia is usually looked as disadvantage, but it becomes advantage in mediation (Chong 2007, 6). In fact, Mongolia may threaten no nation in the region (Molomjamts 2009). Disarmed nature of the "smallness" removes suspicion of Ulaanbaatar's impartiality.

As a small country, Mongolia has no attached interest in any regional disputes, which is the fact solidifying its impartiality. Sandwiched location between Russia and China, on the one hand, isolates it from rest of the world. From this vantage point, it is a disadvantage. But, in the other hand, this location makes Russia and China Mongolia's big buffers that protect it from any possible regional and international disputes, a fact that gives relative advantage. Ulaanbaatar can broker any regional problems impartially since it has no direct interest to the problems, arching from behind its two big buffers.

Neighbor regions of Mongolia composed of global and regional powers, interests of which frequently contradict. Major powers such as the United States, Russian Federation, the PRC, middle powers like Japan and South Korea, and the DPRK, which pursues "protest diplomacy (Henrikson 2006)" are all in NEA. In Central Asia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan effectively pursue pro-Russian policies and Kazakhstan is emerging as a middle power. All these nations play or try to play important roles in regional as well as global politics. Compared to these actors, Mongolia's position is modest and neutral by its nature and takes no attempt to play a major role in regional politics.

MONGOLIA’S BALANCED RELATIONSHIP AND ITS REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

National Security Concept of Mongolia has explicitly declared the nation to have a "balanced relationship" with its two neighbors, giving them a top priority in foreign relation (National Security Concept of Mongolia 2007). The document has also interpreted the meaning of the "balanced relationship" in that it includes "non-involvement and neutrality …to the disputes between the two neighbors unless the disputes affect the vital national interest of Mongolia (National Security Concept of Mongolia 2007)."

Balanced relationship was a word to refer to softer and more flexible policy than neutrality. Legal context of this word includes neutrality, which is conditioned by three major factors: first, scope of actors - Russia and China; second, intensity of conflict –dispute; and third, condition that is not affecting Mongolia's vital interest. By this, Mongolia has avoided the Swiss model of "strict neutrality," which required "some degree of political and economic weight, none of which Mongolia possessed" (Galsanjamts.S 1999, 14).

But in regional security context, Mongolian neutrality turns out to be a very complicated understanding. Neutrality is a certain commitment to self limitation (Lake 2001, 23), but Ulaanbaatar's' self limitation between the two neighbors further extends to region. In every regional issue ranging from Central Asia to Northeast Asia, both Russia and China have attached interests, in which are usually not conflicting, yet frequently different. Mongolia independently makes its decision and side whoever it deemed right or necessary if the issue does not directly affect the neighbors' interests. Mongolian Armed Forces' contribution to OFI has clearly demonstrated the example of this case. Ulaanbaatar, however, refrains from the issue if the neighbors' interests are seriously attached. The case of Six Party Talks evidently demonstrates this scenario, where Ulaanbaatar has deliberately abstained to take a part although there were strong internal pressure and discussion of joining the process, which have had a high possibility to become a regional multilateral security dialogue if it could have successfully concluded.

The latter case explains Mongolia's de facto neutrality in the regional security as a logical extension of its balanced relationship with the two neighbors. This de facto neutrality, which came from "smallness" of the nation, provides a good opportunity of neutral mediation of any regional security issue.

MONGOLIAN INHERENT NEUTRALITY AS A PRODUCT OF HISTORY

Geostrategic location of Mongolia between two giant neighbors, Russia and China, and Ulaanbaatar's experience of taking side for one against the other have eventually produced the doctrine of balanced relationship stated in National Security Concept of Mongolia adopted in 1994 (200712).

Independence and sovereignty of Mongolia exist on the balance of power between Russia and China.
Distortion of this balance may endanger its independence. Due to Russian Revolution in 1917, Russia has temporarily missed a strong government that could keep the balance against China, the balance that has existed since the 17th century. As a result, in 1919 China invaded and destroyed Mongolian autonomy, which was under Russian protectorate. Soviet government has reestablished this balance soon after its consolidation, and Mongolia has again gained its de facto independence from China in 1921. After the WWII, Soviet power has increasingly emerged as a world power shifting the balance in favor of Moscow. This shift has eventually led Mongolia to align with the northern neighbor against the southern, turning Mongolian territory as the first frontline of "a potential battlefield of the two red giants (Galsanjamts.S 1999, 14)"

Primary goal of Mongolia's security policy, therefore, should aim to strengthen the balance of power between the two neighbors, on which its independence is dangling. Neither distortion or shifting the balance greatly in favor of one is unwilling for Ulaanbaatar since it gives a huge geopolitical advantage to one over the other. Aligning with one of them brings the country to on the frontline of a battlefield as the experience of the Cold War has evidently demonstrated. Balanced relationship, therefore, is a product of Mongolia's historic lessons and reflection of its inherent strategy.